New York vultures swoop in on failed Florida bank

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Wilbur Ross, canary in a coal mine
The collapse and subsequent seizure of Florida's BankUnited yesterday is further evidence that the big-money people aren't going to invest in failing ventures until the government steps in to guarantee their losses.

A flock of New York vultures (the leveraged-buyout sector) swooped in to snatch BankUnited, and this morning's Wall Street Journal called it "a stark reminder of how fragile many banks in the country remain."

BankUnited's collapse is the second-biggest of the crisis, topped only by IndyMac's failure last July. The severely undercapitalized FDIC, on the hook for $4.9 billion, sold the bank to private-equity chaps led by John Kanas (formerly of North Fork Bank) and including Wilbur Ross, a Palm Beach socialite by night but a well-known New York-based bottom-feeder on failing companies by day. (Mark Reutter, author of Making Steel, says, "Wilbur Ross is Charles Schwab without the charisma.")

Ross, once known as the "king of bankruptcy" and formerly Mayor Rudy Giuliani's privatization advisor, is like the canary in the coal mine: Where he goes is a sure sign of danger in that particular industry. Sometimes, it's actually the mining industry, as I noted in January 2006 ("Vulture in a Coal Mine"). Sometimes it's steel or other industries. Now it's banks. That's fine, but the current entry of vultures into bank-buying is not exactly a free-market or privatization thing; it's more like corporate welfare, because taxpayers are practically guaranteeing success for the new owners. As the story notes:

When word recently leaked that Mr. Kanas and other investors were contemplating investing in BankUnited, markets cheered the news as a long-awaited sign investors were starting to tiptoe back into the beleaguered industry.

But investors were willing to pump money into BankUnited only after regulators seized it and agreed to protect investors against most losses on the bank's troubled loans. That doesn't bode well for other troubled banks looking to lure outside capital.

This could be the start of a new phase of the current crisis: one in which many medium-sized or small banks will fail, and the hedge funds will finally start turning loose of the money they've been sitting on — but only after the government hedges their bets.

OK, so maybe it's not entirely a new idea for the vulture sector. Anyway, the WSJ story notes:

The private-equity consortium buying the bank includes W.L. Ross, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group and Centerbridge Partners. The sale represents one of the largest private-equity investments into banks since the financial crisis began two years ago.

It's the first bank investment for Blackstone, the New York private-equity giant led by Stephen Schwarzman. The new owners hope to use BankUnited as an acquisition vehicle when other Florida-based banks go under, according to a person familiar with the group's thinking.

Expect to see more of this, in other words: The big money remains frozen solid on the sidelines until a failure is declared, and then, only then, do the private-equity boys start pumping money back into the economy.

Meanwhile, BankUnited didn't fail as a result of the crisis as much as it failed because its execs got too greedy and made bad decisions:

BankUnited, based in Coral Gables, is a high-profile casualty of the banking crisis. Its problems stemmed largely from its forays into risky housing loans. The bank, founded in 1984, specialized in an exotic type of mortgage made to people living outside the U.S. who wanted to buy property in Florida. As of June 30, 2008, BankUnited was holding about $1.4 billion of these so-called "nonresident alien" mortgages, representing 11.4% of the bank's total loan portfolio.

Some investors questioned BankUnited's emphasis on such loans, which primarily went to people in Latin America who wanted a Florida home for vacation or investment purposes. Skeptics argued the loans were riskier than mortgages to U.S. residents because the loans didn't finance borrowers' primary residences. When the Florida real-estate market eroded, some borrowers became delinquent or defaulted on their loans.